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Report on Muncipal Acq'Jisi tion of Public Utili ties -- Prepared by Ci i:{y Attorney, 
Madison, Wisconsin. 
SUBJECT: Public acquisition of a municipal utility. 
In General 
This memo deals with several topics relating to municipal acquisition of a public 
utility, including the procedure for involuntary acquisition, the method of determining 
the basis of a utility's property for just compensation purposes, and some historical 
information on previous acquisition efforts by the City of Madison. 
Historical Information 
Hadison Gas and Electric was incorporated under the laws of Wisconsin on April 
8, 1896 as a wholly owned subsidiary of American Light and Traction Company. 
American Light was a subsidiary of United Light and Railways Col, which in turn was 
a subsidiary of United Light and Power Co. In J.Q34, an advisory election was held 
and the citizens voted 9,357 to 8,622 to purchase Hadison Gas Rnd Electric, but 
refused to sanction a $30,000 bond issue to finance an appraisal of the property by 
a vote of 9,077 to 8,196. 
On August 5, 1941 the Securities and Exchange·canunission issued. an order pursuant 
to Section ll(b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act which reauired United 
Light and Power and United Light and Railways to eliminate from their holding company 
system their interests in many companies, including Madison Gas & Electric. As part 
of its findings and opinions, the SEC stated that an order must be entered in the 
future to direct American Light to dispose of its interests in properties located 
outside the area comprising Hichigan and the adjoining states. Later the SEr. issued 
a supplemental order requiring American Light to dispose of its interests in three 
particular companies. Amid speculation that the SEC might later require American 
Light to dispose of its interest in Madison Gas, Aldermen Leo Straus and l~esley 
Sr:hwegler sponsored a resolution directing the City Attorney to open negotiations with 
Am.:rican Light for the purchase of M G & E. These two aldermen were motivated by the 
idea that if the City wished to purchase, it would.be much more easily accomplished 
while all the M r, & E stock was in the hands of a single mmer. 
On April 16, 19/d, the City Council agreed to contract ·with Stifel, Nicolaus & 
Co. of Chicago for its services as representative of the city in negotiations for the 
purchase of M G & E. Stifel was also required to provide legal assistance to the city 
attorney and secure engineering services to make necessary investigations. In the 
event of an agreement for purchase satisfactory to the city, Stifel was to receive a 
percentage of the purchase price and was to serve as the bonding company for the city 
for the sale of municipal hands to purchase the utility at a specified commission. 
Stifel later hired Duff and Phelps of Chicago as engineers to appraise the value of 
M G & E property. Duff then issu~d a report stating the net book investment to be 
about $8.9 million and estim~ting that a purchase price of $10 to ~12 million would 
be required. Duff also estimated that such a price could be paid from operating 
revenues within 25 years. 
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In early November of 1943 the City Council recommended that a referendum be held 
on making an offer to purchase M G & E for a maximum price of $11 million. Then on 
December 12, 1943 the ~isconsin State Journal printed a major story reporting that 
Stifel's agents had spent over $3,800 on meals, lodging, football tichets and other 
items for aldermen over a ten-month period beginning before Stifel was selected as 
negotiator even though its fee was the highest of all fees submitted in bids. Prior 
to this the two major newspapers had taken sides and had devoted much attention to 
the acquisition issue, and two sides to·ok even stronger stances· after the foul-play . 
revelations, with the State Journal opposed to and the Capital Times in favor of the 
purchase. Also, in March of. 1943, a Taxpayer's Committee was formed to oppose the 
purchase and it ran several adds in the local papers. 
The referendum election was held on April 4, 1944, and the voters defeated the 
proposed offer to purchase by 12,972 to 7,071. 
(This historical information was pieced together from materials contained in 
the City Clerk's file number 11,947 and a scrapbook containing newspaper clippings 
on the subject which is hled by the Municipal Reference Service). 
Procedure for Involun~ary Acquisition 
It should first be noted that Wis. Stats. Section 32.03(1) precludes the ordinary 
exercise· of eminent domain powers under Chapter 32.by a municipality to acquire a 
public utility: 
32.03 When condemnation not to be exercised. (1) * * * T.his chapter 
does not apply to the acquisition by municipalities of the property of 
public utilities used and useful in their business, nor to any city of the 
first class, except that every such city may conduct any condemnation pro-
ceedings either under this chapter or, at its option, under other laws 
applicable to such city. 
Because Madison does not have first class standing, it does not have the option 
of acquiring the utility by eminent domain procedures, and an involuntary proceeding 
must therefore be conform to the requirements of Chapter 197. 
Chapter 197 Procedure 
(1) The first step in the acquisition process is a municipal determination to 
acquire a utility, which is obtained by a vote of a majority of the electors. This 
vote can come about in either of two possible ways because Sec. 197.02 does not specify 
a definite procedure: (a) The Common Council may adopt a resolution in favor of 
acquisition and refer it to a vote of the municipal electors, or (b) under Wis. Stats. 
Sec. 9.20, 15 percent of tile gubernatorial electors can petition the C:ommon Council to 
adopt a proposed resolution, and the council must either adopt it or refer it to the 
electorate within 30 days or it becomes law. · 
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(2) The second step depends upon the date when Hadison Gas and Electric, or 
its predecessor in title, 1vas granted the license, permit or franchise to operate 
within the municipality, for this date will in turn determine what tyne of indeterm-
inate permit the utility now has. The importance of the date of the permit, license 
or franchise was recognized by the Wisconsin court in 1.Jisconsin Public Service Corp •. 
v. Public Service Commission, 231 Wis. 390, 284 N.W. 582, 5R4 (1939), The court 
stated that after the passage of ch. 596, Laws of 1911 (now Sec. 196.55), there were 
two kinds of indeterminate permits, (1) those wit~out the right to a jury determination 
of the necessity of the acquisition, and (2) indeterminate.permits conferred by ch.596 
and carrying the right to a jury determination. Permits without the right to a jury 
verdict were obtained either by consent to future acquisition without such verdict 
when applying for a new permit or franchise after the law of 1907 (now C.hanters 196 and 
197) was enacted, or by surrendering an existing franchise in accordance with ch. 499, 
Laws of 1907, and ch. 180, Laws of 1909 (between July 11, 1907 and January 1, 1911). 
A third way of obtaining a permit was created by ch. 596, Laws of 1911 (Sec. 196.55), 
and by operation of law, utility franchises existing on July 11, 1907 were converted 
into indeterminate permits with the right of jury trial on the issue of necessity. 
See also Pardeeville Electric Light Company ,:::. Public Service Commission, 219 Wis. 
482, 263 N.W. 366 (1935). The Public Service Commission had also adopted the same 
analysis developed by the court above. 8 P.S.C. of W. 177, 179 (1935). 
Madison Gas and Electric was organized in 1896 and no doubt began operations 
shortly thereafter. Although the city clerkrs office claims to have no record of 
the original franchise or license granted M r, & E allowing it to operate within the 
city, a Mr. McNamara of the N G & E legal staff indicated to me that the original 
franchise or license was granted at some time near the date of organization. Under 
these facts then, Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.02 applies because H G & E wasoperatP.d under 
an indeterminate permit obtained by operation of law tmrsuant to Sec. 196.55, and 
if a majority of the electors vote in favor of acquisition, the City must bring an 
action in circuit court agairtst M G & E for an adjudlcation £!!_ the necessity of the 
taking. The question of necessity must be submitted to a jury unless both parties 
waive a jury. 
(3) As the third step, the municipality must give speedy notice to the PSC and 
to the public utility of the majority vote in favor of acquisition and notice of either 
the utility's consent to acquisition by virtue of operating under an indeterminate 
permit· waiving the rip,ht to a jury finding, or (in the case of H G & E) of the jury 
determination of necessity for the taking. Wis. Stats. Sec. 197. ()3, 
(4) After receiving this notice from the municipality, the PSr: must set a 
time and place for a public hearing upon the matters of the just compensation to be 
paid for the property actually used and useful for the convenience of the public. 
The PSC must give the city and the utility not less than a 30 day advance notice of 
the hearing and the municipality must the publish a class 3 notice of the hearing. 
Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.05(1). 
Wis. Adm. Code, P.S.C. Sec. 2.70 provides that during the first session of the 
acquisition hearing,· the P.S.C. will receive evidence and arguments on "the validity . 
of the municipality's determi-nation to acquire and as to the property to be acquired." 
It is at this point in the PSC hearing that the City would present evidence certifying 
the election resWt and the jury finding, plus any evidence it wishes to offer on the· 
~~tter of inclusion or exclusion of certain property from the order, or on the matter 
of the value of the property. 
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H \vould probably be unwise for the C'.l.y to finance its own independent survey 
and appraisal of the utility's property unless the cost would be slight because the PSC staff would no doubt perform that function for the. city. The Wisconsin court 
approved of this PSC function in Lake Supcdor Dist. Power Co. ~· Public Service Commission, 244 W. 58], 13 N.W. 2d 89, 91 (1944), stating: 
"Sec. 196.855 Stats., reads fand still does]: Expenses incurred by 
the commission in making any appraisal or investigation of public utility 
property under the provisions of Chapter 197 shall be charged directly 
to the municipality making the application. * * * 
There is every indication that the legislature intended such investi-
gations to be made and it would appear that the best use that could be 
made of such investigations would be introduction as evidence before 
the Examiner so that the testimony can besubjected to investigation 
and the witnesses examined by counsel of both parties." 
Thus an independent survey and appraisal by the City would quite likely be a duplication of the work of the PSC st;aff. The City might consider it wiser to forgo 
an independent study of the utility's property and instead concentrate its efforts on 
thorough examination of the utility~ experts and PSC staff who testify at the public hearing on the property to be included and its value. 
(5) After the. public hearing, the PSC must then, by order, fix and determine the 
specific items of property which are used and useful for the convenience of the public, 
the just compensation to be paid for that property, and the other terms and conditions 
of purchase which it deems reasonable. Once completed, the PSC must certify its deter-
mination to the Common Council, the utility, and to any bondholder, mortgagee, lienor 
or any person having or claiming to have an interest in the utility appearing at the public hearing. Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.05. Most of the proceedings before the PSC 
upon rghearing and much of the litigation which relates .to public acquisition centers 
around orders issued by the PSC pursuant to Sec. 197.05, with "just compensat:l.on" and 
"property used and useful being the main issuesf and are discussed infra~ 
(6) After the PSC issues its original offer, several things may occur: (a) the PSC order might be appealed, (b) the municipality might discontinue acquisition pro-
ceedings, or (c) the City may purchase the utility by conforming to the terms and 
conditions fixed by the PSC in its acquisition order. 
(a) Appeal of PSC Order. Wis. Stats~ Sec. 197.06 allows appeal from the PSC 
order in the manner provided in chapter 227 (Administrative Procedure Act) and speci-fies that any bondholder, mortgagee, lien-holder or other creditor may take the appeal 
as a party aggrieved. Review under chapter 227 is available on administrative decisions 
which "directly affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person;" Wis. Stats. Sec. 227.15. A person so affected is considered a "person aggrieved" by an 
administrative decision, and if directly affected by the decision, Sec. 227.16 allows 
this person to appeal to the circuit court for Dane County for review by filing a petition within 30 days from the date of the PSC order. At this point mention must be made•of the provisions detailing the administrative procedure within the PSC estab-lished in Chapter 196, which add further complications to the whole process of appeal. Sec. 196.405(1) provides that within 20 days of service of an order upon all parties 
to any proceeding, any such party or other person aggrieved and directly affected may 
apply to the PSC for a rehearing in respect to any matter determined in its decision. 
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Section 196.405 (2) makes this application for rehearing within the 20 days a condition 
precedent to any proceeding for the judici~l review of the original order·under Chapter 
227. The PSC may then.either deny a rehearing expressly or by implication through not 
granting·such rehearing within 20 days of the application, or it may grant a rehearing, 
receive new evidence, and reverse, modify or suspend the original decision by new 
order. When application for rehearing is made, no original order for which a rehearing 
is denied, nor any amended order, may take effect until 10 days after denial or amend-
ment. At this point, the original or amended order becomes the final determination of 
the PSC on the matter from which an appeal can be taken under Chapter 227 (See Subsec. 
196.405(3) and 227.15). If, however, neither party makes application for a rehearing, 
the original order becomes effective 20 days after it is filed and served, unless a 
different effective date is specified in the order. 
On subsequent judicial appeal, if the circuit court determines that the compensa-
tion fixed in the PSC order is unlawful or that some of the terms or conditions are 
unreasonable, the court will remand the order with findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which show the reasons for the judgment and the specific particulars in which 
the order is considered to be unlawful or unreasonable (Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.08). If 
the circuit court finds the compensation fixed in the PSC order to be unlawful, ·Wis. 
Stats. Sec. 197.09(1) requires the PSC to forthwith set a rehearing for the redeter-
mination of compensation, which is to be conducted'as if it were the initial hearing. 
If the court has found other terms and conditions unreasonable, the PSC must revise 
these terms to conform, but it is within the discretion of the PSC as to whether it 
will hold a rehearing on these matters other than compensation; Wis. Stats. Sec. 
227.21, the circuit court's judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court within 30 
days from notice of judgment. 
(b) Discontinuance of Acquisition by the City. Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.04 allows 
the city to discontinue the acquisition proceedings within 90 days after the "final 
determination of compensation by the PSC, and provides two methods for such discon-
tinuance ("final determination of compensation"·means the award made which has not 
been set aside, either upon appeal or from which the right to appeal has expired under 
the law, Wisconsin Power §._ Light '! .. : Public Service· Commission, 231 Wis. 390, 405, 284 
N.W. 586, 593 (1939) ). The first method of discontinuance is initiated by the Common 
Council's passage of a resolution proposing such action, and this resolution must be 
adopted within 90 days of the PSC order. After adoption of the resolution, 90 days 
must pass. before the discontinuance may take effect. The second method of'discontin-
. uance may be initiated by the electors either within 90 days of the PSC order when the 
Common Council fails to adopt a resolution, or within the 90 day waiting period in 
effect if the Common Council has taken such action. This second method requires filing 
with the City Clerk a- petition signed by 10 per cent of the electors (5 per cent in a 
first class city) requesting that the question of discontinuance be submitted to the 
electors. If this petition is filed, the question must be submitted at any general 
or regular election that is possible to b~ held within the six-day period between 30 
and 35 days from the date of filing. If no such election is permitted by law within 
that period, the Coounon Council must order a sped.al election to be held within that 
same six-day period. The council must also give notice of the election once a week 
for three weeks and must handle the election details. If a majority favors discon-
tin.uance of acqpisition, the municipality cannot initiate new acquisition proceedings 
for· the same utility for two years. 
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In the Wisconsin Power !:_Light case, f;upra, the court noted that Sec. 197.04 
requires the city to make some formal effort to discontinue acquisition within 90 
days of the PSG' s making the. "final determination of compensation." However, an 
order does not have t~e full legal status as a "final determination" until it has 
been affirmed at all stages of appeal or until the right to appeal from it. has 
expired by lapse of time. This is because, as the court stated: 
" * * * If, however, an award is set aside on th.e ground that 
if is unlawful or unreasonable, then a new award must be made upon 
the remand of the record to the Commission. When that award is made 
unless ~ aside it will be the final award and the municipality may 
have the statutory time for discontinuance of the proceeding." 
The problem this creates for the city is'that when a PSC award is made and the 
process of appeal is begun, the city does not at that time lmow whether or not the 
order will be ultimately upheld. If the award is unfavorable to the city it can 
take two courses of action: (1) It can assume that the award will be upheld on 
appeal and initiate discontinuance proceeding within 90 days, but the price of this 
is giving up the right to acquire the utility for another two years when that award 
might have been reversed and remanded an~vay and the PSC would have had to issue a 
new order. (2) On the other hand, the city can assume that it can get the unfavorable 
award ultimately reversed on appeal, in which case the PSC will have to make a new 
award and the city would retain the right to discontinue within 90 days of that new 
award. But, if the city is wrong .and the appellate process which ultimately affirms 
the order takes longer than 90 days, the city will. have lost the right to discontinue 
the award, and will have to pay the compensation specified even if unfavorable. 
The court recognized this dilemma, stating further: 
"It is true ·that the making of the award which eventually is 
detemined to be the final award subjects the municipality to the 
hazard of having its right of posession postponed and in the in-
terval the value of the property might diminish and it would be 
bound to proceed, having failed to proceed, having failed to 
commence discontinuance proceedings within ninety days of the 
making, not filing of the award. The statute is imperfectly 
drawn and does not adequately safeguard the rights of either 
party in certain contingencies." 
It is this writer's opinion that if the PSC should ~~ke an award deemed unfavor-
able to the city, it should initiate discontinuance proceedings by either of the two 
methods unless it is certain that either the full appellate process could be conducted 
within 90 days or the order could be reversed in its favor upon appeal. If the 
appeal took longer than 90 days ~ the order was affirmed, the city would be bound 
to acquire the utility on unfavorable terms. 
(c) Purchase Pursuant to the Terms of Order. Until the PSG order is success-
fully appealed from by the utility or until the city discontinues the proceedings, 
the PSC's filing of the certification of its order fixing compensation and other terms 
wi.th the City Clerk vests absolute title in the city, and the circuit court is empow-
ered to force conveyance unde.r Wis. Stats. Sec. 197.05(3). However·, as noted by the 
supreme court in Wisconsin Power !:_ Light, supra, 284 N. "t-1. at 593, the PSC order usually 
allows the city 4 m~mths after final judgments in all possible judicial proceedings 
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have been entered, within '"hich to make up the necessary funds and pay over the 
compensation. Then upon payment and full compliance with the other terms and con-
ditions stated in the order, the PSC will file the certification of the order with 
the city clerk, and the city may take possession with full title. 
It should be noted that the supreme court has recognized wide discretionary 
powers that may be exercised by the PSC in fixing the terms and conditions of pur-
chase; Wisconsin Power!:_ Light, supra. Also, Wis. Stats. Sec. 196.39 allows the 
PSC to at any time, on its own motion, or motion of an. interested party, rescind, 
alter or amend any order, and reopen any case for any reason. But this provision 
for amending or reopening was held to oe inapplicable when the matter involved is 
an involuntary acquisition under Chapter 197 in Superior l~ater, Light!:_ Power Co. 
v. Public Service Commission, 288 N.W. 243 (1940). In that case the court did hold 
that provisions allowing the PSC to grant a rehearing in Sec. 196.405 were appli-
cable to involuntary acquisition procedures though. 
In conc~uding this discussion of the procedure for public acquisition, it should 
be noted that the minute procedural details for rehearings of PSC orders and for 
judicial appeals from such orders are set forth in Chapter 227 and Wis. Administra-
tive Code PSC CH. 2 Sec. 227,20 sets the scope of judicial review, and as will be 
discussed more fully, places a heavy presumption of validity on any action taken by 
an administrative agency. 
Basis for Just Compensation 
The statutes governing an exercise of eminent domain in Chapter 32 set forth 
requirements of an appraisal, detailed standards by which to determine just com-
pensation, and the types of evidence which can be required by the body making the 
determination. As noted above, however, Sec. 32.03(1) makes the chapter dealing 
with eminent domain wholly inapplicable to public acquisitions of utilities by 
cities not of the first class. Yet Chapter 197 fails to provide any similar guide-
lines for the PSC or reviewing courts in determining just compensation, but the PSC 
and the courts have developed some general standards on their own for that purpose 
in acquisition proceedings. 
(1) General formula. The general formula for determining just compensation 
which is used by the PSC and accepted by the supreme court is: 
Cost of reproduction new less depreciation plus going value 
(all taken at the time of the original PSC order) 
Add: net of value of additions to and retirements from utility property 
from date of initial order, plus value of materials and supplies. 
Deduct: additional depreciation accrued since date of initial award. 
see so P.s.c.w. 364, 368; 23 P.s.c~w. 431, 434-38 (1941); 5 P.s.c.w. 510, 517-20 
(1934); Lake Superior District Power Co.~· P.S.C., 244 Wis. 543, 550, 13 N.W. 2d 89 
(1944). 
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(a) Cost of reproduction new (CRN) is an estimate of the cost of reproducing eac~ item of property subject to acquisition, and this may be derived from material 
costs based on the puPchase records of the utility plus labor costs based on the 
utility's work order records; 23 P.s.c.w. at 435. In that acquisition proceeding, 
the PSC accepted the estimate of CRN given by its staff which added to the material 
costs an additional item of 10% as overhead costs covering engineering, supervision, 
interest and taxes, omissions, and other general overheads experienced during con-
struction. 
(b) Cost of reproduction new less depreciation (CRN-D) is arrived at by 
using the "age and life basis" of depreciation. The amount of depreciation of the 
property is reflected in a figure called "condition percent." Condition percent is 
a "comparison or ratio of the elapsed age of each item of property with an estimate (based on experience and data in the files of the Commission) of the total expected 
life or period of use of any such item of property." 10 P.S.C.W. 414, 421 (1935); 
12 P.s.c.w. 335, 339 (1936). CRN is then multiplied by condition percent to yield 
CRN-D. 
(c) The ~upreme court has recognized that a PSC award of just compensation 
must include the "going value" of the utility. l.Jis. Power~ Lir.ht, supra, 211 
Wis. 390, and Lake Superior District Pot~er, supra. As is true in general, the court 
allows the PSC broad discretion in determining going value and all that seems neces-
sary to withstand a challange is that it appear to be clear that "going value" was 
given consideration in determining the figure for just compensation~ 284 N.W. at 595. 
In some of its reports, the PSC has indicate'd some of the general principles by which 
it operates in deter.mining going value. In a case reported at 12 P.s.c.w. 233, 243 (1936) the PSC stated: 
"Our Supreme Court has clearly pointed out that in fixing just 
compensation * * * no allowance can be made either for the value of 
the exclusive privilege under which the utility operates, or of the 
utility's goodwill. 
* * * It seems to us that the only way to determine the value 
of ?nY business arising solely from the fact that that business is 
in operation, is by the exercise of intelligent judgment in light 
of the relevant facts and circumstances which surround the partic-
ular business involved. Certainly, as it seems to us, the "going 
value of a utility" cannot be measured or.: estimated in an acquisi-
tion case either upon past losses or past deficits, which the 
business had incurred, even though those losses and deficits may 
have resulted from attempts of the management to build up the 
business." 
In 10 P.S.c.w. 414, 417 (1935), the PSC cited Jiori.ni ~·City£!. Kenosha, 208 
Wis. 496, as authority for Hs statement that "loss of profits arising from the taking 
of property cannot be allowed in the determination of the just compensation to be made 
to ·the owner of that property, and there is no allowance for good will - only going 
value," 
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In 5 P.S.G.W, 510 (1934), the PSG report describes in detail 3 mathematical 
formulns for determining going value urged upon it by consulting engineers for 
Wisconsin Power & Light. The PSG rejected the complex formula under the theory 
that going value is only a reasonable estimate in light of all the facts and cir-
cumstances. In that case the PSG engineers presented testimony that GRN-D was 
$8,645 and the PSC award was $10,000. Assuming adoption of the staff's estimate, 
·going value was about 16 percent of GRN-D. 
In 23 P.S.C.\-1, 428, 436 (1941) the P.s.c. stated: 
"We do not believe that going value should be determined hard-
and-fast percentage. We have not used such a percentage to reach our 
determination. However, if the going value of the Edgerton property 
considered by us were stated in a separate amount and were reduced 
mathematically to a percentage bas:f.s, the amount thereof would fall 
between 7 and 8 percent of the physical ·property including overheads." 
This should present some general idea of how the PSr. would establish go:l.ng 
value in an HG & E acquisition, but whatever it sets as goinp, value would probably 
be upheld on appeal unless very clearly unreasonable. 
(d) The PSC 1 s initial order fixing just compensation ,n_n include an amount 
to be ascertained later for the value of materials and supplies (if not already 
valued and included), for net additions to or retirements from the ~rooerty subject 
to acquisition between the date of the initial award and time of payment, and for 
additional depreciation since the date of the m.;rard, The . PSC 's. order will usually 
include a provision that the city and the utility can negotiate and reach an agree-
ment on these items prior to payment, but if they fail to a?,ree, the PSr. will step 
in and ascertain the amounts; see 23 P.S.C.H. at 437. 'The PSC will ge!lerally re-
quire the making of an ongoing accounting for additions and retirements from the 
date of the initial order; \.Jisconsin Power~ Light Co. ~· P.S.C., 231 Uis. 390, 408, 
284 N.W. 586, 594 (1939). 
(2) Lump-sum Nature of Award. In the \.Jisconsin Pm.;rer ~Light and ·r.ake 
Superior District Power cnse? cited above the supreme court gave specific approval 
to the PSC's practice of stating the just compensation to be paid in one lump sum 
without presenting the figures for each element involved ih that figure such as CRN, 
condition percent, and going vaiue. In Wisconsin Power ~Light the court stated, 
284 N.W. at 596: 
·~ fair hearing does not require that the findings he split up 
so as to make the determination of the Commission more readily subject , 
to attack. 
* * * Unless upon the whole case it is made to appear that the 
Public Service r.omrnis;.ion has proceeded contrary to law or has arrived 
a·t an unreasonable result, the Court must approve its determination. 
* * * If the procedure followed by the Commission amounts to due 
process it must be approved, It is not the province of the court to 
prescribe rules of procedure for· an administrative body. 11 
·~· 
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Th~s, the crucial role in a municipal nrquisition is played by the PSG. I 
might note that there appear to be no cases in which the supreme court found the 
amount of compensation determined by the PSG to be so unreasonable as to require 
reversal. 
(3) Role of· the PSC Staff. In examining the municipal acquisition cases 
in the PSG Reports it became quite apparant that in determining just compensation, 
the evidence and testimony presented by staff engineers is ':leavily relied on. As 
noted in 23 P.S.C.W. 428, its engineering department will conduct an appraisal of 
the property and charge the expense to the municipality. The legal staff may also 
assist in the preparation of the engineering staff's testimony and in the cross 
examin~tion of other witnesses. 
Under Wis. Stats. Sec. 196.13 the PSG is required to publish biennial reports 
and subsection (2) requires the PSG to publish in its reports the value of all the 
property and of the physical property actually used and useful for the convenience 
of the public for "every public utility as to whose rates, charges, service or reg-
ulations any hearing has been held by the commission on the va1u~ of whose property 
has been ascertained by it." The PSC's biennial report for 1973-1975 presents very 
general information not of the type that seems to be required by this statute. I 
will be attempting to obtain information from the PSG from ~1ich a general estimate 
of the amount likely to be awarded as just compensation can be drawn. 
The Property Actually Used and Useful for the Convenience of the Public. 
A municipality's power to acquire is limited to the property actually.used and 
useful for the convenience of the public (Sec. 197.01(3)). Some indication of the 
meaning ascribed to this phrase by the PSG appears in several cases and PSG reports. 
If the municipality considers acquiring property of the utility located outside 
its boundaries, "the question submitted to the people must expressly or by general 
language, * * *, include such property, else the commission has no power to include 
it." Wis. !_. ~ L. :!:.• PSC, 231 Wis. 390, 284 N.W. 586, 591 (1939). 
Once the municipality has voted in favor of acquisHion, it c'annot agree 'nth 
the utility upon the specific property to be taken unless the PSG has given its con-
sent and approval. Wis. f· ~~.,·supra. 
Section 196.57 states that a utility's operation under an indeterminate permit 
·is deemed to be consent to a purchase of the used and useful property by the munici-
pality in which the major part of it is situated. In Wis; f.·!:!_~·~· PSC, 224 Wis. 59, 286 N.W. 555 (1939), and in Wis. P. & L. v. PSC, 224 Wis. 586, 272 N.W. 50 (1937), 
the court relied on this statute in holding that under certain circumstances, the PSC 
must include property located outside the city and property inside the city used to 
serve other areas. The court looked at factors such as (1) the extent to which rural 
customers now served would he left without pO\-Ter, (2) the advantage to the city in 
continuing to sell power to rural customers, (3) whether there is any other utility 
in the vicinity, and (4) whether the property is an integrnl part of the whole power 
system which only incidentally happens to serye others. In conclusion, the court 
stated in both cases that if a municipality takes over a utility "it should step in 
the shoes of the public utility owning the property and continue to furnish service 
not merely to the inhabitants within the city limits, but also to the people living 
near by but outside the city limits." 
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Hm.;ever, in \-lis. Power~ Light v, PSC., 232 Wis. 43, 286 N.W. 581 (1939) the court, 
in an entirely different case, limited the scope of the "entity theory" of the proper
ty 
used_and useful. The cpurt stated that Sec. 196.57 "was intended to apnly to the or-
dinary and then existing pu~lic utility which served a given municipality and in add-
ition some customer consumers beyond the limits of the municipality," and that is the
 
extent of the property the municipality must acquire. The fact that a public utility
 
has operation~ in other municipalities which with the municipality seeking acquisition
 
are operated as a single unit, does not require the latter to acquire the utility's 
property located within other municipalities. 
The PSC has indicated that a lease of property used by the utility in its operations 
is not subject to its authority to determine what property is used and useful. 12 P.S.C. 
w. 233, 246 (1936) 
Tne PSC has also approved of the principle that once a municipality votes in favor 
of acquiring a municipality, a sale by the utility of any of its useful property is, 
in effect, a violation of the utility's agreement under the indeterminate permit, and
 
"con~stitutes an act in derogntion of the mun:!.cipaHty' s rir,ht to acquire all of the 
property subject to acquisition. If the ~~i4~jf,~'J,~ mnkP.s such a sale, the value of 
it wfll be subtracted from the amount of just compensation awarded. 
In general the supreme court has allowed the exercise of much discretion by the 
PSC in determining what property is used and useful for the convenience of the publi.c
. 
1ypical is the ~ Superior District Power case, supra, in which the court held that
 
this matter is a question of fact to be found by the PSC. Its fact finding can only 
be set aside on grounds that it is unreasonable and will not he disturbed unless the 
court finds that the character of the order is clearly unreasonable. 
Election Requirement for Bonds to Finance Involuntary Acquisition. 
The question may arise as to whether a municipality which has voted to acquire a 
utility involuntarily under Chapter 197 is required approval in another election the 
issuance of bonds for makinr, the payment o-f the just compensation fixed by the PSC. 
After much searching for authority in the court reports and the PSC reports it appear
s 
that the issue has arisen only on one occasion back in the years when the Railroad 
Commission was responsible for fixing just compensation in uti.lity acquisition proceed-
in~s r#her than the PSC. The decision in James v. City of Racine, 155 Wis. 1, 25, 
143 rr~-w. 707 (1913) contains the following broad statement: 
" * ·* * And if, in view of the terms and conditions of sale imposed 
by the railroad commission, it becomes necessary to issue bonds to pro-
cure the purchase price, it can do so without any further vote of the 
electors. Their vote to purchase the plant must be held to include a vote 
to raise money by the issuance of bonds if. that method be deemed neces-
sary or expedient by the city counCil." 
Althouth Chapter 197 mentions no additional election requirement for the method 
of financing the acquisition, it might be a good idea to tie a provision authorizing 
the issuance of bondfin with the general question of whether or not the municipality 
should acquire the utility. 
• 
-331-
MOnicipal Indebtedness? Article XI, ~~ction 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
clearly provides that "An indebtedness created for the purpose of purchasing, ac-quiring, * * * , controlling, operating or managinp, a public utility of a town, 
village, city or special district, and secured solely by the property or income of 
such public utility, and whereby no municipal liability is created, shall not be 
considered an indebtedness * * * , and shall not be included in arriving at such debt limitation." 
Voluntary Purchase of a Utility 
lvis. Stats. Sec, 66.065 confers upon municipalities the power to acquire prop-
erty located within or without its boundaries for furnishing water, light, heat or . power to itself or its inhabitants. The same statute ·also allows the acquisition 
of a controlling portion of the stock of any corporation owni.ng private waterworks 
or lighting plant and equipment located within the municipality. The statute also 
allows the municipality to purchase the equity of redemtion in a mortgaged or bonded 
'"aterworks or lighting system. (Equity of redemption is defined generally as the 
equitable title to property left in the mortgagor representinR his remaining interest 
and his right to pay the amount of the debt and have full title restored by discharg~ ing the liens on it). Sec. 66.065 governs the situation in which the acquisition of; 
either of the above three items is by ·voluntary negotiated purchase. The distinction between.acquisitions under Sec. 66.065 and Chapter 197 was made in Pardeeville Electric Light Co. ~· PSG, 238 Wis. 97, 297 N.W. 394 (1941). 
Subsection (2) of 66.065 requires the adoption of a resolution by the ·common Council specifying the method of payment to be used in any voluntary purchase and 
submitting the question to a referendum. The resolution must be adopted at a reg-
ular meeting of the council one week prior to which notice that the matter woul<J.be 
considered must be published. 
Section 66.066 provides that the city may, by acti.on of the governing body, finance the voluntary purchase of either of the three items from the general fund 
or from the proceeds of municipal bonds or mortgage bonds or mortgage cer.tificates. Subsection (4) provides that in lieu of a tax levy or issuance of bonds or certif""!'. icates as a method of financin~ the purchase, the municipality can provide for or . 
secure payment of the cost by pledging, assig:ni.ng or otherwise hypothecat$-ng shar•a · 
of stock evidencing a controlling interest in the utility, or by pledging the net · profits to be derived from the operation of the utility. The minute details gover-
ning each method of financing a voluntary purchase are also contained in Sec. 66.066. 
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